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1. Introduction 
The attempt to clarify the touchy relationship between anthropology 
and missionary work is not easy: many a discussion still appears to run 
into polemics and mutual recrimination. It seems that somewhat more 
fundamental debates on the relationship between these two branches of 
activity in non-western countries are avoided' (although empirical 
research on missionaries and their influence seems to take off in recent 
years; see the important study of Beidelman). 2 
Perhaps this is out of respect for the good work that many missionaries 
(undoubtedly) have done or still do; or because of the persistent belief 
that, if missionary work or missiology may perhaps be said to import 
foreign, non-indigenous values into other cultures, anthropology in the 
end does the same thing; and perhaps the fact that in the field 
anthropologists are often dependent on the goodwill and support of 
missionaries plays a role as well. 
Further commenting on the second point here, it is true that anthropol-
ogy has, in some respects, of course to be seen in the context of its 
Opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editor. 
1. Cf. for example the provocative article of C. Stipe, "Anthropologists versus Mis-
sionaries: the influence of presuppositions", in: Current Anthropology, 1980, 21, 
pp. 165-168. 
2. T.O. Beidelman, Colonial Evangelism: a socio-historical study of an East African 
Mission at the grassroots, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982. 
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western pedigree - it has sometimes assumed some imperialistcharac-
teristics, 'constituting' its research objects from an external, utthtanan 
vantage point, and not on a shared level of analysis and commitment 
with the subjects studied. But I will argue here that anthropology ts on a 
more fundamentally different level with regard to human praxis than 
missiology and missionary work, and that it is time that this point is fully 
recognized. . . 
There is a regrettable tendency to obfuscate the baste dtfference be-
tween anthropology (in its research and its applied form) and mission-
ary work as forms of human (i.e. western) activity in or vis:a-vis non-
western, traditional societies: the latter as unabashed commitment and 
tmposition of absolutist values, the former more modest, tentative and 
"·If-critical, aimed at more knowledge and understandmg. In thts 
paper, 1 want to focus especially on the issue of the 'valu~ commitment' 
, ,r the respective proponents of anthropology and the mtsswns, and on 
their 'rationality', linking the debate to a point in epistemology. 
A recent contribution to the debate is the article of C. Stipe,3 which will 
he used as a stepping stone for the argument in the present p~per, which 
I intend constituting a critique of missiology as a form of tdeologtcal 
discourse. 
2. The different perspectives of anthropology and missionary work 
It may be obvious that the goals and characteristics of anthropology 
and missionary work, as activities often directed to the same field of 
subjects or objects of study, differ in an explicit manner. Anthropology 
is by definition more detached, trying first to obtain knowledge and/or 
explanations on sociocultural phenomena and human behavtor; to 
dfect change is secondary or not at all destred. Mrsstonary work (sup-
ported by the purported scientific basis of missiology) tries to i~duce 
rat her farreaching religious and social change among non-Chnsttan, 
traditional, often non-literate, people. Its practitioners do this in their 
si 11ccre conviction that the people missionized deserve a more positive 
spiritual development (cf. various articles in Smalley 1967, also 
Stipe. ibid. 
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Trueblood 1972, Verkuyl 19784). This is a point where anthropolo-
gists are at issue with missionaries, being the scepticists-relativists they 
are (see later): the missionary stance is seen as blatant 'applied ethno-
centrism'. Anthropologists wonder why missionaries think they are 
entitled to deliberately interfere with non-Christian societies in order to 
recreate them in a Christian way. Since Frazer and Durkheim most 
anthropologists are of a different opinion. 
This, for anthropologists, vexingly normative point of view of the 
missionaries time and again evoked practical problems in the field as 
well as theoretical discussions on their mutual achievements and tasks 
(although it seems that those discussions have never really straightened 
out things; see for some recent articles Hiebert 1978, Beidelman 1974, 
Sal am one 1977) 5 
The following issues strike me as still central in the ongoing debate to 
which clear answers have not yet been given, especially not by the 
missionaries: 
- May one interfere uninvited with other cultures of which one has 
relatively poor knowledge, without creating unnecessary conflict and 
confusion? Is anthropology here not less 'guilty' than missionary 
work? Can one accept the Christian 'urge to missionize'6 simply as 
legitimate? 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Do the supposed positive contributions of missionary work outweigh 
the negative ones? 
How can one really 'translate' one's own values, concepts and ideas 
in those of other cultures? 
Must we work towards cooperation and 'division of labor' between 
anthropologists and missionaries, and if so, how? 
W. Smalley, Ed., Readings in Missionary Anthropology, Tarrytown, N. Y.: Practi-
cal Anthropology, 1967~ E. True blood, The Validity of the Christian Mission, New 
York: Harper and Row, 1972 and J. Verkuyl, Contemporary Missiology. An 
Introduction, Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans, 1978. 
P. Hiebert, 'Missions and anthropology: a love/hate relationship', in: Missiology, 
1978, 6, pp. 165-180; T.O. Beidelman, 'Social theory and the study of Christian 
missions in Africa', in: Africa, 1974, 44, pp. 235-249, and F.A. Salamone, 
'Anthropologists and missionaries: competition or reciprocity?', in: Human Orga-
nization, 1977,36, pp. 407-4!2. 
See Trueblood, ibid., passim. 
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- Is the source of the fairly frequent mutual hostility a question of 
personality, of academic socialization, or of discipline? 
The article of C. Stipe (1980) can in several ways be considered as an 
interesting recent contribution to the discussion of these questions. His 
article gives us an opportunity to enlarge upon a more fundamental 
issue underlying this troubled relationship between anthropology and 
the missions. Contrary to what Stipe asserts it is not only a problem of 
the personal psychology of the anthropologists, but has to do with the 
status, form and use of value commitment of missionaries and 
anthropologists vis-a-vis other cultures, as remarked in the Introduc-
tion. One general point of departure for the discussion may be the need 
to abstain as much as possible from any a priori values or beliefs as 
axioms for evaluation of human behavior or cultures in interocultural 
communication. The same may be said of the communication or recep-
tion of knowledge of the non-western societies or cultures where both 
anthropologists and missionaries are active. From the outset mutual 
openheartedness and respect are a condition sine qua non, especially 
during cooperative ventures of any kind in a post colonial area. It is a 
truism to say that there is no such thing as a value-free science or that 
'value-free' is an ideological notion known to every scientist. This is only 
true to a certain extent. It does not refute the desirability of arguing in as 
value-free a manner as possible while presenting the results of research. 
My rationalist point of view is here that we, as human beings wishing to 
comprehend and acquire respect for people of other cultures before 
judging them, never have to fall back prematurely to a 'retreat to 
commitment'': this is not logically entailed by the view that absolute, 
value-free science or communication is impossible. I fear that this 
essentially excludes 'missiology' from the scientific debate, because of 
its explicit basis of value commitment (i.e. to understand missionaries 
and their methods, and the people to be missionized, in order to 
facilitate their eventual conversion). 
Missionaries do consciously make the step to commitment and ground 
their approach to other, non-Christian peoples in a normative frame-
7. See W.W. Bartley, Ill, The Retreat to Commitment, New York: A. Knopf, 1962. 
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work ultimately deemed superior, although there is no intrinsic reason 
to do so. 
If one objects that missionaries have completely different goals than 
anthropologists, this can be admitted, but this means at the same time 
that: a) they in fact admit to being a kind of 'applied ethnocentrists' and 
that they are in danger of being called spiritual or cultural imperialists 
(which often has happened in Third World countries'· b) for mission-
aries, increase of knowledge, better understanding 'and respectful, 
equal treatment of people of other cultures is in fact not of primary 
Importance. We see this reflected in the words of W. Merrifield, direc-
tor of the controversial Summer Institute of Linguistics (which is cri-
tically evaluated in Hvalkof's and Aaby's book 9 He admitted that, 
despite the scientific-linguistic work of the members of the Institute 
translation of the Bible in native vernaculars and the distribution of it~ 
message, was their 'underlying motive', in accordance with the injunc-
tions of the Christian Bible itself. The Christian conviction 'obliges' him 
and his colleagues to be concerned about the members of primitive 
cultures who do not yet know Christianity. w 
The goal of the missionaries is thus incommensurable with that of the 
anthropologists, who are much more modest and take the tentative 
exploration of cultural and social differences as prime concern, even-
tually (and increasingly) discussing their implications in a dialogue with 
members of the societies studied. In this respect anthropology has 
advanced significantly in the last few decades. 
It is therefore a bit too simple to state that anthropologists and mission-
anes operate in two different domains which can be held separate one 
being as legitimate as the other, and that mutual tolerance would b~ the 
?nly correct attitude. 11 This will not solve the problem of the recurring 
Irntatwn and hostility. 
8. 
9. 
See Trueblood, ibid., pp. 27-28. 
S. Hvalkof and P. Aaby, Eds., I~ God an American? An anthropological perspective 
on the w~rk of the Summer lnstttute of Linguistics, London-Copenhagen: Survival 
Internatwnal-IWGIA, 1981. 
10. See _J. Benthall, 'The Summer Institute of Linguistics', in: Royal Anthropological 
lnsfltute News, 9, pp. 1-5. 
11. Compare F. Salamone, ibid. 
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3. The attitude of anthropologists toward the missions 
The relationship between anthropologists and missionaries must be 
examined carefully in order to explain this strain. Stipe (1980), who can 
be said to be well disposed towards the missionary point of view, does 
not question the legitimacy of the two spheres and looks into the source 
of the negative attitude of anthropologists versus missionaries. He 
states that 1. anthropologists when being educated hear above all nega-
tive judgments and opinions in regard to missionaries; 2. anthropolo-
gists express sometimes presuppositions which cloud a good view of the 
missionaries. Both points need some consideration in addition. 
1. In a rather bold statement, Stipe asserts that: "Even though there 
seems to be little systematic indoctrination, early in their training 
anthropology students learn that missionaries are to be regarded as 
'enemies'.", 12 but he does not subsequently ask himself whether there 
would eventually be any reason for anthropologists being sceptical 
about missionaries. He implies that there should be no reason at all. But 
I think that there may be some historical reasons for the ambivalent 
attitude of anthropologists towards missionary work. Perhaps it is not 
necessary to give here a description of what missionizing in practice 
often meant to traditional cultures; but it has to be recognized that its 
effects have often been less blissful than many persons want us to 
believe. We cannot close our eyes for the fact that missionizing was 
often closely associated with 'the brute force' of western economic and 
political penetration; often constituted an instrument of colonization; 
caused confusion and tragic splits in native populations as well as social 
and identity crises, due to its speedy and forced imposition ofbehavioral 
change. In many cases, missionizing was characterized by opportunism, 
expanding its influence in the shadow of white political and colonial 
dominance. Frequently missionaries did not know how to bridge the 
contradictions between the morals that they preached and the morals in 
practice (i.e. of the white traders, soldiers or administrators). Mission-
aries came without being invited and often stayed on even when their 
visit was not appreciated and when their words and intentions were 
rejected. In this context we can ask ourselves what would happen when 
12. Stipe, ibid., p. 165. 
25R 
ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE MISSIONS 
missionaries should chance to find a religious tradition with elements of 
their own Christian belief, e.g. monotheistic, with comparable ethical 
standards and a universalist scope? Even then they would push on, 
because their specific religious outlook tells them to. A case in point is 
perhaps Ethiopia, where a large part of the population was already 
Christian for ages, when missionaries (first Catholics, later Protestants) 
came with the intention to 'reform' ritual and dogma and to expand the 
faith, in order to make the Ethiopians 'true believers'. This exasperated 
the kings and the population more than once. In 1874 king Yohannis IV 
at one time shouted to the missionaries, who claimed to have the true 
Scriptures and commentaries, that he was 'sick of their books', and tried 
to get rid of them.B 
In the same way the Falashas of Ethiopia, among whom the German 
missionary J .M. Flad worked, were satisfied with their own religion, 
knew what Christianity stood for and answered him: "We don't want to 
believe in Jesus or to become Christian, therefore we don't want to see 
you again. We remain what our fathers where ... "14 
One may also recognize a certain cynical aspect of missionary work, viz. 
when presenting itself as a moral factor to neutralize the more negative 
aspects of western civilization. This unavoidably leads to misplaced 
paternalism. For many missionaries, the positive aim was to integrate 
Christianity into the religious structure and the religious values of the 
traditional societies they encountered. Western world civilization in its 
'crude, material-technological form', was, in the words of one mission-
ary-anthropologist, aimed at expanding the 'external inventory' and at 
elevating the 'purely material standard of living of the individual' 15 
Rescuing cultural values is for him then made dependent on the effec-
tive transmission of the true Christian religion in a world of materialism 
and decay (by proceeding secularization, indifference, etc.). This view 
may be valid for some people, but not for all; and the leap to an all-
embracing faith may, for some, be the solution, but it is not for us 
13. See J.M. Flad, Sechzig Jahre in der Mission unter den Falaschas in Abessinien, 
Giessen: Brunnen Verlag, 1922, p. 352. 
14. Flad, ibid., p. 359; my translation, J.A. 
15. R. Mohr, Missionsethnologie. Ein wissenschaftliches Programm, Nijmegen: Dek~ 
ker en van de Vegt, 1956. 
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westerners to prescribe this for others. A critical dialogue and an 
enlarging of the possibilities for choice and communication between 
people of different cultures trying to come to terms with the problems of 
life is to be lauded, but an imposition of values and metaphysical 
dogmas is not. Even the most recent contributions in periodicals such as 
Missiology still are dominated by the latter tendency. 
Still, one frequently hears positive facts about the missions; and it would 
be absurd indeed to deny their grand historical role and the meaningful 
contributions they have made. Many missionaries were sincere, con-
cerned persons, who were also able to extend material, medical and 
educational assistance to people in need. They also played an important 
role in, for example, the combat against slavery in the 19th century. 16 In 
many cases they were for traditional peoples the first whites who really 
stood in contact with them, lived among them and tried to understand 
and defend them. But unfortunately they often did this for the wrong 
reasons and with ulterior motives, redundant to the good work itself. 
We also often meet the claim that missionaries have made positive 
contributions to ethnology and that without their work, many facts 
would have remained unknown (the work of Henry Junod on the 
Tsonga is often mentioned). This is quite true; but everything they 
produced they produced as ethnographers; i.e. they did not have to be 
missionaries for that. In other words, it is pure coincidence that they 
also gathered ethnographically relevant material; their religious calling 
had not brought them to foreign countries for that. 
In this as on other points in the discussion on the relationship between 
anthropology and the missions, the fundamental issue remains that of 
the attitude towards value commitment. Stipe suggests that the problem 
is the same for both anthropologists and missionaries: " ... it is now 
generally accepted that the concept of an 'objective observer' who does 
not let personal values influence observations and conclusions is a myth 
... Presuppositions influence the way in which we look at situations. " 17 
But how different is the issue handled by each camp! Anthropology tries 
16. See E. Kendall, The End of an Era. Africa and the missionary, London: Society for 
the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, 1978, p. 26. 
17. Stipe, ibid., p. 166. 
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to put aside value orientations during the research process itself, defines 
them clearly or puts them to the test. Its practitioners do not - com-
pared with missionaries - try to change people with a conscious policy 
and an underlying attitude of spiritual superiority. If they do - which of 
course happens - they are much more the target of criticism than 
missionaries. If anthropologists take their science seriously, they try to 
keep the results of their research open to criticism and amendment, in 
order to advance knowledge and to further understanding, or to make 
clear what practical policy choices - if these have to be made - would 
entail. Thus, criticizability is largely instituted in anthropology as a 
science. The underlying values of the practitioners themselves are also 
the object of scrutinity. 
2. The two incorrect ideas that anthropologists have and which in-
fluence their attitude toward missionaries are according to Stipe 18 the 
conceptualization of primitive cultures as 'organic unities', and the view 
that religious beliefs are essentially meaningless. 
On the first point, I have not much to add to what various commentators 
on Stipe's paper in Current Anthropology (like Grottanelli or Feld-
man19) have already said. Few anthropologists in the second half of the 
20th century would indeed adhere to the view ascribed to them by Stipe. 
The discussions on functionalism as a theoretical perspective have 
ended a long time ago with the recognition that processes of change and 
social dynamics should not and cannot be neglected, although they 
indeed differ in pace and intensity among the different types of society. 
Feldman has rightly remarked that the greater amount of integration in 
traditional societies is often no illusion - in these societies the various 
social segments are more mutually dependent, due to small scale and 
less structural differentiation; and the individual has a relatively closer 
bond with them. 
Not only is the second 'presupposition' noted by Stipe unconvincing, it 
is probably entirely misplaced. If anthropologists think that religious 
beliefs in general are meaningless, how is it to be explained that much of 
18. Stipe, ibid. 
19. V. Grottanelli, 'Comment', in: Current Anthropology, 1980, 21, pp. 169-170; H. 
Feldman, 'Further thoughts on anthropologists and missionaries', in: Current 
Anthropology, 22, 1981, pp. 297-298. 
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the best work in the anthropology of religion, as to theory formation, as 
well as to empirical studies has come from the atheists or agnostics 
among them? If the argument is meant to convey that anthropologists 
give the world religions less than their 'due amount' of meaning, it is 
correct: these religions should be treated with the same anthropological 
methods of analysis as any tribal or traditional religion. But Stipe means 
that, because anthropologists do not attach much importance to religion 
in their own lives, they are apt to underestimate its role and function in 
the lives of other people, even to misinterpret it. This is very doubtful, 
as the works of anthropologists like Geertz, Horton, Spiro, Firth, 
Radin, and many others may attest. Furthermore, the issue is not to 
explain the attitude of anthropologists on religion from their personal 
beliefs or psychological make-up. Stipe himself says in a footnote: 20 
" ... one does not have to be religious to believe in the existence of 
supernaturals to take the position that religious beliefs are very impor-
tant". Indeed, but this position entails quite something else for 
anthropologists than for missionaries: the former do not make the 
premature jump to religious metaphysics and the supernatural; the 
latter do, because they see it as inescapable, even as an obligation. 
We may conclude that anthropologists and missionaries have a funda-
mentally different, epistemologically grounded view of religion as a 
human and cultural phenomenon, and the position seems to be much 
more vulnerable to criticism than that of the anthropologists. The latter 
have for instance more eye for the connection of religion with other 
sectors of culture. Especially among socalled 'neo-Tylorian' or 'intellec-
tualist' anthropologists of religion (like e.g. Horton; see also Guthrie ), 21 
looking primarily at beliefs and not at ritual, religious beliefs are taken 
seriously indeed (in this respect, Stipe's claim that the Radcliffe-Brown-
ian idea of 'study the ritual, not the belief' is still followed in anthropol-
ogy, is doubtful). 
Anthropologists have no high esteem for the tacit religious absolutism 
of the missions. With more justification it could be said in turn that it is 
20. Stipe, ibid., p. 167. . . . . . . , . 
21. R Horton, 'Neo-Tylonamsm: sound sense o.r .stmster preJUdice_?.' m,: NJ.an (N.S.), 
3, 1968, pp. 625-634; S. Guthrie, 'A cogmttve theory of religiOn, m: Current 
Anthropology 1980,21, pp. 181-194. 
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missionaries themselves who see religious beliefs of indigenous peoples 
as meaningless: in relation to their own beliefs. 
4. Clarification of the problem 
To bring the problem of this tenuous relationship nearer to a solution, 
it might be interesting to present in detail one of the core issues dividing 
the two camps. A good starting point is provided by B. Delfendahl's 
comment22 : ". • • a missionary, as such, invites himself to teach 
mankind, convinced that he is endowed with that others lack and that it 
is his mission to convert them to it ... The anthropologist as such, goes 
to learn from mankind. The two attitudes are essentially opposed, even 
though, in individuals, they may be mingled. Of the two it is rather the 
anthropological than the missionary attitude which leaves the door open 
to mutual influence or exchange ... The missionary attitude implies a 
one way flow and in extreme cases, unilateral imposition." 
What is the origin of the force missionary represents, and from which is 
derived its supreme authority and right of say? The answer is: God, and 
the transcendental, revealed, universalist belief in the message of 
Christ. 23 
E. Trueblood, another Christian author, equates being a Christian with 
being a missionary. 24 
The Christian attitude of faith and belief in its essentially immutable 
character, valid for all people and all places can, in my opinion, be seen 
as one specific answer to the basic philosophic problem of the diversity 
of cultures, customs, moral values and standards, and the longing for 
the experience of a Universe that makes sense. This is a problem which 
the philosopher E. Topitsch has called:25 "the value irrationality of the 
world process" ( = "Die Wertirrationaliti.it des Weltgeschehens"), 
which seems to demand of everyone a metaphysical stand. To adopt 
-when being confronted with the bewildering variety in human thought, 
belief and behavior- the Christian faith)s of course a subjective leap of 
22. B. Delfendahl, 'On anthropologists versus missionaries', in: Current Anthropol-
ogy, 1981, 22, p. 89. 
23. Kendall, ibid., p. 10. 
24. Trueblood, ibid., pp. 69-70. 
25. E. Topitsch, Vom Ursprung und Ende der Metaphysik, Miinchen: Deutscher 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1958. 
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faith, a non sequitur to a very basic and essential problem. It may attract 
some people, but certainly cannot provide all of us with a satisfying 
philosophical or cosmological outlook. A fortiori, this means that other 
people are entitled to take notice of the existence of more than one 
option except for the Christian. Furthermore, to import belief here as 
mediating tool in communication and contact with those of others, is an 
illogical assumption to which most anthropologists, as anthropologists, 
will object. It opens the door for dogma, for religious and moral 
absolutism, which in the end leaves no room for traditional beliefs and 
values of other societies, and prevents their developing these in their 
own way. Feldman26 has noted the same point: "Christian dogma insists 
that at some point one must abandon reason and entirely rely upon 
faith. Fieldworkers, as scientists and rationalists, find this doctrine 
obnoxious." But the missionary position is then that, in the end 
anthropologists are also committed to a leap of faith (and that their 
scepticism and relativism is unjustified and even inconsequential27). The 
answer of Stipe28 to the above reproach is that " ... rationalists (among 
them he counts the non-religious anthropologists, J .A.) also rely on 
faith in believing that there is a naturalist explanation for everything." 
This is a version of the socalled Tu quoque argument, widely discussed 
in philosophical debates a few years ago. It is defined by philosopher J. 
Agassi29 as follows: "Tu quoque, says the irrationalist to the rationalist, 
you likewise have made a leap of faith, in your very jump to commit 
yourself to the life of reason; for prior to your becoming a rationalist you 
had no reason to become one. Hence, your central choice was as 
irrational as mine." This argument has been for a long time a serious 
challenge to rationalists. But let alone that chosing a rationalist and 
ethical point of view will be preferred to an irrationalist one as being 
26. Feldrnan, ibid .. p. 298. · 
27. Cf. Merrifield in his talk with Benthall (Benthallj ibid., p. 5). He remarks: "It's our 
society who are the sceptics, who reject supernatural influences in ou_r lives .... " 
And: "We will continue to insist on certain theological points which, m our View, 
are the heart of the Christian message. We realize that some intellectuals may think 
we are naive for taking the Bible at face value, but we can live with that." 
28. C. Stipe, 'Reply', in: Current Anthropology, 1980, 22, p. 298. 
29. J. Agassi, "Rationality and the Tu Quoque argument", in: Inquiry, 1973,16, pp. 
395-406. 
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unbiased, a rationalist answer has been provided for by W. Bartley."' 
This answer essentially implies that if we try to come to more knowledge 
on, and better understanding of other cultures, there is no logical reason 
why we should not cling to a rationalist viewpoint in order to hold open 
the possibility of explaining events and phenomena in a naturalist way. 
Bartley in effect asserts that this rationalist position can be rationally 
defended, if we define it not in the sense of being justifiable, but in the 
sense of criticizable, that is subject to criticism with the possibility of 
being refuted, including the principle of using reason itself. 
This argument works on the assumption that both missionaries and 
anthropologists intend to understand, explain and improve the social 
and religious life of the traditional peoples among whom they work; that 
is to say they would want to further the latter's self-knowledge and to 
create the possibility improve themselves with new knowledge about 
them (although of course anthropologists more so than missionaries). 
This almost universally accepted, tacit presupposition of cognitive ad-
vancement makes rationalism a logical obligation in the social sciences 
as well, because it means suspending any ill-founded beliefs of a 
religious or 'historicist' nature as guidelines for policy, research, etc. 
If we further apply this viewpoint to the relation between anthropology 
and missionary work, we see that the latter falls short of the standard: 
for missionaries there is an unquestionable scale of values, with clear, 
unambiguous ideas and norms couched in a religious framework which 
for them can only be true. Thus, viewed in this context of transcultural 
communication and problem-solving, the Christian missionary view-
point is ultimately a one-sided, ethnocentric form of discourse. Com-
pared with this, anthropologists - if they are conscious of the 
epistemological status of their science as a rational enterprise offering 
30. Bartley, ibid., and: 'Rationality versus the theory of rationality', in: M. Bunge, 
Ed., The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy, New York-London: Free 
Press-Collier MacMillan, pp. 3-31, 1964. The philosophical debate which has 
followed upon Bartley's publications (e.g. in Philosophy), centered on the question 
of whether his solution is rationally tenable, will not be treated here. It is sufficient 
to conclude that this solution is still more attractive than any other to date, because 
it is still capable of being refuted with critical argument. See also: W. W. Bartley, 
Ill, 'On the criticizability of logic- a reply to A.A. Derksen', in: Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences, 1980, 10, pp. 67-77. 
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tentative, falsifiable descriptions, theories and explanations - remain 
much more free of this. They are, as a rule, more modest; they can not 
only keep their results and conclusions, but also their rational method 
itself open to criticism, until a better one can be offered (which has not 
occurred yet) 31 In this way they can suspend judgements based on 
metaphysical and religious values. In other words, the missions are 
committed to particular values which are not a priori valid for everyone 
and every culture; anthropology puts values to the test, offering at the 
same time a better way to argue, in a real dialogue, about this problem. 
Unfortunately, a missionary attitude in practice often inhibits free 
discussion and growth of knowledge, and often prevents traditional 
cultures from clearly and openly facing the many problems that the 
modern age poses: social and economic change, cultural identity, con-
tact with a technologically advanced culture, etc. 32 
In sum, the accusation of missionary-minded persons that anthropolo-
gists also make an irrational choice (for rationalism) which they purpor-
tedly embrace with a leap of faith, is therefore not valid. The two 
positions are logically not on the same line. Thisaspect of the problem 
has not been sufficiently emphasized.· 
5. Background of the problem 
As we noticed earlier, missionaries implicitly claim to have an answer 
to the problem of the diversity of cultures and moral standards, while 
they see the anthropologists as being unreflecting relativists who in-
troduce their own values after all. It is true that frequently anthropolo-
gists are not aware of this problem. In a debate with the missionary-
minded it is important that they should not fall into the trap of relativ-
ism, which seems to have lingered on surprisingly long in 
anthropology. 33 
We have to realize that not (being capable of) accepting relativism and 
31. See N. Koertge, 'Bartley's theory of rationality', in: Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences, 1974, 4, pp. 75-81. . . . 
32. See H. Feldman, 'More on the antagonism between anthropologists and mtsston-
aries', in: Current Anthropology, 1982,23, p. 114. . ·. 
33. I. C. Jarvie, 'Cultural relativism again', in: Philosophy of the Socwl Sciences, 1975, 
5, pp. 343-353. 
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'anarchy ofvalues',forms the background of the missionary reproach to 
anthropologists (see Merrifield in his talk with Benthall34). This 
reproach does not recognize the fact that we are mainly concerned here 
with a methodical relativism. Whether those same anthropologists are 
also cultural or ethical relativists is not relevant - some are, some are 
not. Admittedly, cultural relativism is, in the end, self-defeating, 
because a relativist may logically be forced to defend, or at least toler-
ate, beliefs and practices which are abhorrent to him/her personally. 
Jarvie has aptly remarked:35 "Relativism is a curiously unreal view. No 
one can actually live by it (even anthropologists - for if they do they 
become amoral)." 
But the discussion on relativism has advanced beyond the question of 
whether to adopt a simple relativism or absolutism. Apart from noting 
that, if relativism is morally and logically untenable it does not follow 
that (e.g., Christian) absolutism is valid, one can conceive of a weaker 
form of absolutism, within a critical rationalist tradition, to provide a 
solution for the dilemma. 
6. 'Weak absolutism' as a point of departure 
The term 'weak absolutism' was coined by Jarvie. 36 It can be con-
sidered an option for anthropologists because it is in line with the basic 
assumptions of intercultural comparative social science: the unity of 
mankind and the universality of rationality (which is basically defined as 
" ... the application of reason to tasks, effective action to achieve 
goals"37). 
'Weak •absolutism' recognizes that some non-relative truths exist, i.e. 
some absolute, non-culturally relative truths. Adherents of this view 
believe neither that their culture or they themselves have a monopoly of 
truth nor that all cognitive efforts are on a par (strong absolutism says 
that there are no relative truths and that all truths are absolute; relativ-
34. Bentha!l, ibid., p. 5. 
35. Jarvie, ibid., p. 348. 
36. I. C. Jarvie, 'Rationality and relativism', in: British Journal of Sociology, 1983,34, 
pp. 44-60. 
37. Ibid., p. 48. 
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ism asserts that all truths are relative and that non-relative truths do not 
exist. 38 
Quite a number of anthropologists still cling (consciously or not) to 
relativism, missionaries to strong absolutism. Many anthropologists 
(perhaps the majority) adhere to the weak absolutist view, which is 
much more fruitful when assessing problems of knowledge, soc1al and 
cultural change, development, etc. in a transcultural perspective. There 
is a connection between weak absolutism and the rationality involved in 
learning about the world, when we subject our experience of cultures, 
customs and ideas to criticism and assessment; " ... the general1dea of 
promoting rationality becomes indistinguishable from the project of a 
critical tolerant and undogmatic search for mtellectual and socml 
progre;s. "39 This project is far from wholly succesful yet; but it may be 
clear that the contribution of the missions 1s surely not sufhc1ent, and as 
such, unsatisfactory. It presents a metaphysical program and a dogmatic 
outlook the adoption of which is not at all imperative. In this respect, 
the missions should undergo a metamorphosis in the direction of the 
project alluded to above. 
7. Conclusion 
On the basis of moral and epistemological arguments, there are fewer 
and fewer grounds to recognize missionary work in traditional cultures 
or societies as a legitimate, unquestionable activity. The negative atti-
tude of anthropologists toward missionaries is not primarily a result of 
baseless presuppositions, but of an epistemological difference. 
Anthropologists stick to reason as long as possible in a fully accountable 
manner; missionaries (unwittingly or not) prefer absolutlst comm1tment 
and want to present this as the solution for other peoples. 
In the present conditions in the world, in a post-colonialera and marked 
by deep social and cultural problems of commumcatwn, m1ss1onary 
work has hardly anything to contribute of its own - in more and more 
countries the missions are seen also as inhibiting the autonomous search 
· for more authentic forms and expressions of cultural and social identity. 
38. Ibid., pp. 46-47. 
39. Ibid., p. 47. 
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Many missionaries recognize this development as well. They become 
more independent and see their 'mission' more in personal terms. Then 
they can set a personal example for others, be of great social and human 
value in their educational, pastoral and medical work. They will keep 
their (Christian) motivation for doing so for themselves, seeing their 
belief as a personal inspiration which does not have to lead to conver-
sion activities. Then non-Christians can also decide for themselves what 
elements of Christian belief they wish to adopt. 
J. ~bbink ~as b.o.rn in 1954 in Winterswijk (Netherlands). He studied at Nijmegen and Le1~en Umverstties (M. A. ~nthropology, B.A. History). He is now working at the Ins~Iti!te .of Anthropology .. His Ph. D. thesis: THE FALASHAS; the problem of ethnic 
assimilatlOn has been pubJJsh_e_d recently. Main research interests are the history and 
theory of anthropology, cognitive anthropology, ethnology of Ethiopia. 
269 
